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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 18-3314 
________________ 
  
 
PETER J. CRESCI; JANE DOES 1-50; JOHN DOES 1-50 
 
v. 
 
SUSAN GYSS, a/k/a SUSAN GYSS GREGORY; 
JOHN DOES 1-4; XYZ CORP 1-3, fictitious Corps 
 
PETER J. CRESCI, 
Appellant 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-17-cv-02342) 
District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 24, 2019 
 
 
Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 3, 2020) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Peter J. Cresci sued Susan Gyss alleging that, as a municipal prosecutor in 
Bayonne, New Jersey, she harassed him and violated his constitutional rights.  His pro se 
complaint brought numerous claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including malicious 
prosecution, excessive force, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and First Amendment 
retaliation, as well as various state-law tort claims.  The factual assertions in the 
complaint are not entirely clear, but the essence is that Cresci was charged with 
harassment of a tenant, and he believes that Gyss behaved improperly in prosecuting that 
charge.   
The District Court granted Gyss’s motion to dismiss the complaint.  See Cresci v. 
Gyess, 2018 WL 4961466 (D.N.J. 2018).  It based its decision principally on a finding 
that Gyss was absolutely immune from civil suit under § 1983 for her actions as a 
municipal prosecutor, an argument with which Cresci did not meaningfully engage.  Id. at 
*3–*6.  Despite this finding, the Court went on to explain why each of Cresci’s federal 
claims merited dismissal for other reasons, including failure to state a valid claim and 
failure to comply with the statute of limitations.  Id. at *6–*12.   
Having dismissed each of the federal claims, the Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Cresci’s state law claims, id. at *13.  It therefore dismissed 
the entire complaint with prejudice.  Id.1 
                                              
1 Although normally a complaint would be dismissed without prejudice, Cresci had 
already withdrawn one complaint in the face of a motion to dismiss and filed an amended 
complaint.  Thus the District Court concluded that amendment would be futile. 
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Cresci, still acting pro se, now appeals, but he does not mention the dispositive 
issue in the District Court’s opinion—prosecutorial immunity—in his opening brief.  His 
reply brief attempts to engage on this issue, but (even setting aside the usual rule that 
arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived, see In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 
224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003)) offers no substantial reason why the Court erred.  Instead, he 
suggests that “qualified immunity,” as he terms it, does not apply at the motion-to-
dismiss stage.  This is incorrect; both qualified and absolute immunity are not just a 
defense to liability but “an entitlement not to stand trial,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511, 525 (1985), and therefore may be raised at any point during litigation, including by a 
motion to dismiss.  See Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2008).  Next, Cresci 
suggests that Gyss was not truly a government employee but rather a mere “contractor,” 
and thus she is not entitled to an immunity defense.  Although the Court has held that 
some private contractors providing government services are not entitled to official 
immunity, see Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997), this is not an absolute rule.  
Rather, it is a narrow exception to the general rule that private contractors rendering 
government services can assert official-immunity defenses.  See Filarsky v. Deia, 566 
U.S. 377 (2012) (holding that a lawyer retained by the government on a limited basis to 
conduct an investigation could assert qualified immunity). 
The bulk of Cresci’s argument, however, is that Gyss violated clearly established 
rights and would have known that her conduct is wrongful.  This might matter were she 
entitled only to qualified immunity (and, again, if Cresci had not waived the issue).  But 
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity.  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 
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(1976).  We do not inquire at all whether a prosecutor’s actions were wrongful or 
unlawful so long as they are “undertaken . . . in preparing for the initiation of judicial 
proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of [the prosecutor’s] role as an 
advocate for the State.”  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).  The District 
Court explained at length why Gyss’s alleged actions fell within the scope of her role as a 
prosecutor and hence were entitled to absolute immunity.  Cresci does not challenge that 
finding, or its resulting conclusion, aside from his argument about Gyss’s supposed 
contractor status.   
We agree with the District Court that Gyss was entitled to absolute immunity from 
Cresci’s federal claims.  Accordingly, Cresci’s main arguments on appeal—which 
challenged only the alternate grounds given for dismissal—are immaterial.  We conclude, 
moreover, that the denial of supplemental jurisdiction over Cresci’s state-law claims was 
not an abuse of discretion.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if the district court has dismissed 
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”). 
Thus we affirm. 
